Three Conceptions of Self

Posted on 2012/06/25 by tetsukoizumi

Tetsunori Koizumi, Director

The question of “who I am”, or “self”, has been one of the central concerns in the history of thought. A wide array of answers provided by various thinkers can be grouped into three conceptions representing the three traditions of thought on this question: (1) self as an autonomous being, (2) self as a relational being, and (3) self as an illusionary being.

(1) Self as an autonomous being: The idea that “self” is an autonomous being, not only with a separate body and mind from others but also with a distinct and unique personality, can be found in the traditions of Judaism, Protestantism, Greek philosophy, and humanism. Judaism, starting out as it did with a communal religion of a specific people, is known for the idea of a chosen people. However, it was Ezekiel who emphasized that each individual, rather than the people as a collective, would be judged for his or her acts and rewarded, or punished, accordingly.¹ The individual conception of the chosen in the Judeo-Christian tradition was revived by Protestant reformers such as Martin Luther (1483-1546) and Jean Calvin (1509-1564), who asserted that questions of faith and salvation are matters to be decided by each individual in his or her personal relationship to God.

To the Greek philosophers, man was a special animal endowed with the power of reason. Aristotle, for example, viewed man as possessing three souls—the nutritive soul which he shares with plants, the sensitive soul which he shares with animals, and the rational soul which is peculiar and unique to man and man only. The Greek conception of “self as an autonomous being”, revived by Renaissance humanists, would find its clearest formulation as an organizing principle of political life by such revolutionary humanists as John Locke (1632-1704) and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) in their conception of a liberal democratic society.

(2) Self as a relational being: Unlike Protestants, Catholics give importance to the idea that the Church of Rome has the sole authority in interpreting matters of faith and salvation, and thus plays the function of the sole agent in performing such sacraments as baptism, communion, and holy matrimony. To the extent that the Church serves this function, the conception of “self” appropriate for Catholics is defined in the context of interaction among themselves as they participate in sacramental and other communal activities.

Hinduism considers man as going through the four stages of life: brahmacharya (student), grihastha (householder), vanaprastha (forest dweller), and sannyasa (hermit). The first two stages conceive “self” in its communal aspect. However, these stages are, in a way, preparations for the final goal of accomplishing moksa, or “liberation”, which is to be attained by every individual Hindi.

Establishing social order was the primary concern of Confucius, who saw two possible paths towards social order: the path that relies on jen, or the “ethics of aspiration”, i.e., man’s willingness to become the “superior person” or the “gentleman”, and the path that relies on li, or the “ethics of restraint”, i.e., various forms of social constraints. While the “superior person” served as an ideal, Confucius was well aware that most people would belong to the category of the “inferior person” or the “small man”, who, in contrast to the “superior person”, is concerned with small things in life and, therefore, needs to be supervised with the ethics of restraint. The purpose of li is to guide people into the right frame of mind, with a detailed set of instructions as to how they ought to conduct themselves towards one another, as represented by the five relations—the ruler-subjects relation, the husband-wife relation, the parent-child relation, the older sibling-younger sibling relation, and the older friend-younger friend relation. In his conception of the five relations, Confucius’ thought represents the conception of “self as a relational being” in its strictest form.³

(3) Self as an illusionary being: Those who advocate the conception of “self as an illusionary being” may be said to be a minority in the history of thought, as this concept is asserted by only a handful of thinkers, such as Lao Tsu and the Buddha. Moreover, the realization that “self” is an illusion comes only as a result of enlightenment. As Lao Tsu put it, “To understand others is to be wise, but to understand one’s self is to be illuminated. One who overcomes others is strong, but he who overcomes himself is mighty.”⁴

The Buddha is known to have gone furthest in the conception of “self as an illusionary being”. For the Buddha, a human being, like everything else, is a composite entity, or an aggregate, composed of many interacting elements. That man is an aggregate of interacting elements implies that there is no such thing as a constant and unchanging “self”. “Self” is, thus, an illusion: “For this atman, this self, this ego in the ‘I say’ and in the ‘I will’ is an illusion.”⁵ Represented by the concept of anatta, the Buddha’s conception of “self” is actually “no-self”, which naturally follows from his idea of paticca-samuppada, or “dependent origination”, as the fundamental principle that regulates all the manifest phenomena in the world around us.

Self in the world of global interdependence: What is the appropriate conception of “self” in the world of global interdependence that is evolving around us? With the pervading sense of confusion among individuals who appear to be lost in the vast space of global transactions of goods, services, and information, it is obvious that the world of global interdependence needs a new conception of “self” if individuals are to regain the sense of stability and security that their ancestors used to enjoy in their communal life in neighborhoods, villages, and small towns.

The conception of “self as an autonomous being” is no longer appropriate, especially when it is applied to the economic arena where “economic man/woman”, with his/her rational calculation in pursuit of his/her self-interest, has converted the world economy into a global casino, with growing inequalities among individuals and nations, and has caused the destruction of the Earth, upon which our existence depends. The conception of “self as a relational being”, while appealing if we are to establish any semblance of order in the world as a social system, fails as an organizing principle of social life in the world of global interdependence characterized by an expanding network of diverse, convoluted interactions and transactions among individuals and social groups. The conception of “self as an illusionary being”, while no doubt true in the world of ultimate reality, also fails as an organizing principle of social life in the world of conventional reality unless it helps us to succeed in transcending the desire to have a secure sense of “who I am” in that expanding network of diverse, convoluted interactions and transactions among individuals and social groups.

If no single conception of “self” is appropriate, what is needed may perhaps be the conception of “self as a composite being” that combines the three conceptions of “self”, each of which has prevailed in a specific society in a specific age. The conception of “self as an autonomous being” has its place in the world of global interdependence, for it is important to have a sense of autonomy in the face of all kinds of diverse and conflicting pieces of information that bombard us every second, every minute, every hour, and every day through the media and the internet. On the other hand, the same information and communications technologies that confound us make it possible to develop the conception of “self as a relational being”, by making us aware of the interconnectedness of all individuals and societies in the world and the need for responsible behavior in that interconnected world. And we would have to transcend both “self as an autonomous being” and “self as a relational being” when we realize that we—and indeed all entities in the universe—are, after all, composite entities that are constantly formed and dissolved. The conception of “self as an illusionary being” will help us develop the sense of humility and modesty in our relationships not only to our fellow human beings but also to all the other sentient and non-sentient beings in the universe.

For the origin and development of Judaism, see, for example, Rosenberg, Roy A., The Concise Guide to Judaism, New York: Meridian, 1994.
For a concise discussion of Hinduism, see, for example, Sen, K.M., Hinduism, London: Penguin Books, 1991.
See Confucius, The Analects, London: Penguin Books, 1979.
Lao Tsu, Tao-Te Ching, New York: Modern Library, 1993, Chapter 33.
Carus, Paul, The Gospel of Buddha, Oxford: Oneworld, 1994, p. 33.

The Buddha and Confucius on “reciprocity” in social relations

Posted on 2012/04/20 by tetsukoizumi

Tetsunori Koizumi, Director

The Buddha’s teaching on how suffering is the basic condition of life in the world and how it can be overcome, as summarized in the Four Noble Truths (Cattari Ariyasaccani), contains a message that carries universal relevance, transcending the specificity of the time and place into which he was born, in which he grew old, and from which he passed away. In contrast, the Buddha’s teaching on the proper mode of conduct in social life, given to people from all walks of life during his long career as the Venerable One, reflects the specificity of the time and place in which he was active.

Consider, for example, the Sigalaka Sutta, in which the Buddha instructs Sigalaka, the householder’s son, in the importance of worshipping the six directions: “And how, householder’s son, does the noble disciple protect the six directions? These six things are to be regarded as six directions. The east denotes mother and father. The south denotes teachers. The west denotes wife and children. The north denotes friends and companions. The nadir denotes servants, workers, and helpers. The zenith denotes ascetics and brahmins.”¹

The last two directions the Buddha adds to the four directions of east, south, west and north clearly reflect the reality of the Hindu society of his day, with the Brahmin class occupying the highest station in the social hierarchy among the four castes. But did the Buddha grant a special status in society to the Brahmin class as the heirs to Brahma? That this was not the case is made clear in the Assalayana Sutta, in which the Buddha talks about purification with Assalayana, the Brahmin student. After a lengthy debate with this young student known for his intellect and knowledge, the Buddha succeeds in convincing Assalayana that what is important in a person is neither one’s birth nor spiritual learning, but whether one is virtuous and of good character. In fact, the key word that describes the proper mode of conduct in the relationship between the Brahmins and the lay people, as is true with the other five relations in the six directions, would be reciprocity: “There are five ways in which a man should minister to ascetics and Brahmins as the zenith: by kindness in bodily deed, speech, and thought, by keeping open house for them, and by supplying their bodily needs. And the ascetics and Brahmins, thus ministered by him as the zenith, will reciprocate in five ways: they will restrain him from evil, encourage him to do good, be benevolently compassionate toward him, teach him what he has not heard, and point out to him the way to heaven.”²

Given that the six directions summarize the Buddha’s idea on the proper mode of social conduct in his day, it is interesting to compare them with Confucius’ ideas on the same subject. In the five relations, Confucius talks about the proper mode of conduct in social life as represented by five social relations: between rulers and subjects, between parents and children, between husbands and wives, between older and younger siblings, and between older and younger friends.³ Here, too, the specificity of the time and place of Confucius’ day is clearly reflected in that the rulers-subjects relationship comes first. The question of establishing and maintaining social order was the primary concern for Confucius, living, as he did, in the middle of the turbulent time of Chinese history known as the Spring-Autumn period.

While both the Buddha’s six directions and Confucius’ five relations no doubt reflect the specificity of the time and place in which they led their lives, there is commonality in the messages they convey as they both address the vital question of how to establish and maintain social order and harmony. And both the Buddha and Confucius point to the importance of reciprocity in social relations, namely, quid pro quo deemed appropriate in any specific social relation, though its content may vary from one relation to another. In the case of Confucius’ five relations, rulers should be benevolent, subjects loyal; parents should be loving, children reverential; husbands should be good, wives listening; elder siblings should be gentle, younger siblings respectful; elder friends should be considerate, younger friends deferential. A similar idea about the importance of reciprocity is also expressed in the case of the Buddha’s six directions: one person performs his/her duties and obligations, while the other person reciprocates by performing his/her duties and obligations, where the contents of these duties and obligations are defined in the context of the Dhamma, as each person is expected to behave as a noble disciple.

Although the Buddha does not include the rulers-subjects relationship in his six directions, the proper mode of conduct in accordance with the Dhamma also applies to kings in his conception of raja cakkavatti, or the “wheel-turning monarch”, the just and righteous king who rules his kingdom with the Dhamma. This concept is recorded, for example, in the Anguttara Nikaya: “a wheel-turning monarch, a just and righteous king, who thus provides lawful protection, shelter, and safety for all, is the one who rules by the Dhamma only. And that rule cannot be overthrown by any hostile human being.”⁴ Replace “Dhamma” with “Mandate of Heaven”, and this quote could well have been the words of Confucius.

What would the Buddha and Confucius have to say on the proper mode of conduct in social life in a democratic society? The fact of the matter is that they have very little to say on this. In this sense, their teachings do not go beyond the social realities of their time and place. After all, they are talking about the proper mode of conduct in social life as social philosophers, not as social reformers, though Confucius is known to have searched the land for a sovereign who would put his social philosophy into practice. As for the Buddha, it is to be noted that his talk about the wheel-turning monarch quoted above is a prelude to his talk about his own role as the just and righteous king of the Dhamma and as the Fully Enlightened One “who turns the incomparable wheel of the Dhamma in accordance with the Dhamma only.”⁵

We can, of course, speculate what the Buddha would have to say on the just and righteous government in a democratic society. We can surmise what the Buddha’s opinion on this subject might be from his dialogue with Ananda, recorded in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, which he intended as a reply to the question put to him by the chief minister to King Ajatasattu of Magadha, who wanted to attack the Vajjians. Having heard from Ananda that the Vajjians held regular and frequent assemblies, the Buddha says: “Ananda, as long as the Vajjians hold regular and frequent assemblies, they may be expected to prosper and not decline.”⁶ Thus, “holding regular and frequent assemblies” seems to be one component of the Buddha’s idea of the just and righteous government that rules by the Dhamma in a democratic society. But beyond this, no further hints are available to us because the Buddha talks about the just and righteous government of a non-democratic country of his day.

We can further speculate what the Buddha would have to say on the proper mode of conduct in social life in a democratic society, which develops its own scheme of social stratification, if not hierarchy, based, for example, on wealth and family ties. Although the kinds of social relations may be different from those the Buddha observed in his day, it is unlikely that we would get any other answer from him than “reciprocity”, namely, quid pro quo deemed appropriate in any specific social relation, whether that relation is between elected officials and citizens, between employers and employees, or between merchants and clients. In any event, what is important for those of us living in the world of the twenty-first century is to have a clear understanding about what aspect of the Buddha’s teachings has the universality that goes beyond the specificity of time and place in which he delivered his discourses.

Bhikkhu Bodhi, In the Buddha’s Words: An Anthology of Discourses from the Pali Canon, Wisdom Publications, 2005, pp. 116-117.
Ibid., p. 118.
See Confucius, The Analects, London: Penguin Books, 1979.
Bhikkhu Bodhi, op. cit., p. 115.
Ibid., p. 116.
Ibid., p. 138.