Actions without actors

Tetsunori Koizumi, Director

It was October 1970 when the Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, visiting Washington for a summit meeting with the U.S. President, uttered what he intended to be diplomatic words: “I will do the best I can.” The words were in response to the request from President Richard Nixon to do something about the trade imbalance between the two countries as low cost textile products from Japan were flooding the U.S. markets. Needless to say, President Nixon was acting on behalf of the U.S. textile industry, whose viability was threatened by a rising economic power from Asia.

Prime Minister Sato’s original words in Japanese were: “zensho simasu (善処します)”, which the interpreter translated into: “I will do the best I can.” There was nothing wrong with the translation, except that the interpreter failed to convey, intentionally or unintentionally, that Prime Minister Sato was politely saying, “Let’s see what can be done,” without actually mentioning who would be taking what action. The Japanese would know that these words, when spoken by a politician, actually mean “doing nothing”. In fact, the lack of action on the part of Prime Minister Sato to force the Japanese textile industry to exercise export restraint went on to aggravate the trade friction between the two countries.

This episode illustrates the importance of paying attention to the cultural context behind the use of words. While Prime Minister Sato was using the words, “I will do the best I can,” in the context of Japanese culture in which such ambiguous expressions abound, President Nixon was interpreting the same words in the context of American culture, in which they would mean: “I will personally see to it that something is done to remedy the situation.” The English translation, “I will do the best I can,” leaves no doubt who will do the best. On the other hand, the original Japanese expression leaves who will do the best ambiguous as the personal pronoun “I” is omitted.

Omitting personal pronouns is a rule in the Japanese language, not an exception limited to this episode. The issue, here, is not the right way of speaking but the way the Japanese actually speak in daily conversations, which Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), a Swiss linguist who is widely recognized for his pioneering work in modern linguistics, called the parole, as opposed to the langue, aspect of the Japanese language. When you ask your friend, “Do you like apples?” it is clear to whom the question is addressed. Or is it? When a Japanese asks this question, he or she will typically omit the personal pronoun “you” and simply ask, “Like apples?” And the person to whom this question is put will usually answer, “Like apples,” omitting the personal pronoun “I”.

It goes without saying that, when personal pronouns are omitted, who is asking the question to whom becomes ambiguous. When you are proposing that someone marry you, it is vitally important to make clear who is proposing to whom. In English, there is no ambiguity as to who is proposing to whom, for the question is expressed as: “Will you marry me?” But in Japanese, the same question gets condensed into a single word: “Marry?”

There is thus an inherent ambiguity about persons behind actions in the parole aspect of the Japanese language. In contrast, it is almost imperative in the English language to make explicit persons behind actions. A typical sentence in English has a “subject-verb-object” structure. While this structure makes explicit who does what, it can create other problems, as David Bohm (1917-1992), a theoretical physicist, points out: “This (the subject-verb-object) is a pervasive structure, leading in the whole of life to a function of thought tending to divide things into separate entities, such entities being conceived of as essentially fixed and static in their nature.”1 In the case of a marriage proposal, “Will you marry me?” the person who is asking the question and the person to whom the question is put are clearly separated. In this case, the fixed and static nature of things in a sentence is essential, for you would expect a specific person, not just anyone, to return your question with an answer: “Yes, I will marry you.”

The “subject-verb-object” structure in English reflects the underlying culture of English-speaking societies, where a person is regarded as having a distinct self, separate from others. This is in sharp contrast to the Buddhist conception of self, which is regarded as arising out of cooperation of five elements called panc upadanakkhadha, or the “five aggregates”: rupa (form), sanna (perception), vedana (feeling), sankhara (volitional formations), and vinnana (consciousness). The ordinary person, whom the Buddha calls assutava puthujjana, or “the uninstructed worldling”, views self as arising out of these five aggregates: “Here, monk, the uninstructed worldling … regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. He regards feeling as self … perception as self … volitional formations as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness.”2 But the Buddha reminds us that nothing that comprises the five aggregates is “self”: “Monks, form is nonself … Feeling is nonself …Perception is nonself … Volitional formations is nonself … Consciousness is nonself.”3

This is the Buddhist idea of anatta, or “non-self”, namely, the idea that self is an illusion. We humans are, like other things that exist in the manifest world of conventional reality, composite entities consisting of five factors, which together define what we think we are. But there is nothing behind any one of these five factors, as each factor is empty of a separate self. This is not to deny that there are actions such as speaking, walking, and meditating. What is denied is the existence of a self that controls each of these actions. As the Buddha reminds Moliyaphagguna in response to his questions about who is behind actions with respect to the four kinds of nutriment, “there are actions, but no actors.”4

In omitting personal pronouns, the Japanese seem to be following this Buddhist dictum that “there are actions, but no actors.” But are they? Do they omit personal pronouns in their conversations because they are following the Buddha’s teaching about “non-self”? To be sure, there are some Japanese who omit personal pronouns out of their homage to the Buddha’s teaching. But for most Japanese, omitting personal pronouns is a way of conveying to others that they are not self-centered individuals. In a society where “a nail that sticks out gets banged down,” omitting personal pronouns is one way in which the people make sure that they do not “stick out”.

Today, the traditional Japanese value of humbleness and modesty is being undermined by the influx of foreign cultures into Japan with globalization. With the spread of English as the language of global business, the Japanese, are beginning to adopt the custom of making explicit personal pronouns in their conversations. The prolifertion of English in business and other areas of social life may lead to the erosion of the Japanese custom of omitting personal pronouns. That erosion, in turn, may lead to the erosion of the Buddhist idea of non-self among the Japanese as they live in a country where exposure to the Buddha’s teachings is limited among small numbers of practitioners. Indeed, English, with its pervasive “subject-verb-object” structure which divides things into separate entities, may also lead to the erosion of another important idea in Buddhist thought, namely, paticca samuppada, or the idea of “interconnectedness of all things in the universe”.

  1. Bohn, David, Wholeness and The Implicate Order, New York: Routledge, 2002, Chapter 2.
  2. Bhikkhu Bodhi, In the Buddha’s Words: An Anthology of Discourses from the Pali Canon, Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2005, p. 340.
  3. Ibid. p. 341.
  4. Nidanasamyutta, Samyutta Nikaya Part II. Chapter I.12.

Are there laws in nature?

Tetsunori Koizumi, Director

While Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) is well known in the history of science for his discovery of planetary laws of motion, it was Rene Descartes (1596-1650) who explicitly and rigorously formulated the “laws of nature” in the way the term is employed in modern science. However, as one who lived in the age of transition from the medieval world of faith to the modern world of reason, Descartes did not quite remove God from his discussion of the laws of nature, for he states, in a letter he wrote in 1630, that “it is God who established the laws of nature.”1

If Descartes did not remove God from his discussion of the laws of nature, what about Isaac Newton (1643-1727), a true giant in the history of science who contributed more than anybody else to widespread acceptance of the modern concept of scientific laws. With his use of precise mathematical formulations, we would suspect that Newton had no need for God to be the lawmaker behind his laws of motion and his law of gravity. If there was need for God, it was because the world was created by him in such a way that was susceptible to mathematical formulations, as Newton wrote in his Optics published in 1704: “All these things being considered, it seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties, and in such proportion to space, as most conduced to the end of which for which he formed them …”2 We also know that God appears in the famous epitaph written in 1727 for Newton by Alexander Pope (1688-1744): “Nature, and Nature’s laws lay hid in night: /God said, Let Newton be! And all was light.”

Scientists still talk about the laws of nature today, except that they no longer regard them as being established by God. As Stephen Hawking (1942- ) and Leonard Mlodinow (1954-) state in their The Great Design, “Today most scientists would say a law of nature is a rule that is based on an observed regularity and provides predictions that go beyond the immediate situations upon which it is based.”3 Thus, a law of nature is not something that is established by God but is something that is discovered and formulated by the scientist based on his/her careful observation of a natural phenomenon. And just as was the case with Newton, scientists today also try to express their laws of nature in mathematical terms that would capture observed regularities behind natural phenomena. The laws of nature in this modern sense are to be found in all of the natural sciences, from physics to chemistry to biology.

The ubiquity of the laws of nature in scientific disciplines shows that regularities do exist behind natural phenomena. The prevalence of regularities behind natural phenomena that enables scientists to predict beyond the immediate situations observed leads to the idea of determinism, the idea that all physical systems in nature follow deterministic laws. The laws of nature in classical physics such as Newton’s laws of motion and his law of gravity are outstanding examples of deterministic laws of nature.

While the idea of determinism has played an important role in classical physics, does the idea still play an important role in physics today, especially in the wake of the revolutionary implications of quantum mechanics regarding the uncertainty of the scientist’s observation of natural phenomena at the subatomic level? To be sure, scientists no longer believe that all physical systems consist of solid and impenetrable particles whose behavior is describable and predictable by deterministic laws. However, scientists have not quite abandoned the idea of determinism. In fact, quantum mechanics simply has led to a new form of determinism: “Given the state of a system at some time, the laws of nature determine the probabilities of various futures and pasts rather than determining the future and past with certainty.”4

If the laws of nature, while still regarded as deterministic, no longer determine the future and past with certainty, in what sense do they represent universal truths about the way nature works? In other words, is a law of nature a truth universally acknowledged? The answer has to be: No. Just like the opening sentence in Pride and Prejudice by Jane Austin (1775-1817), “a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife,” is not a truth universally acknowledged outside of a specific society in which Mr. Bingley operated, the validity of a law of nature depends on a specific context in which the scientist makes his/her observations and formulates his/her theories. Taken out of a specific context of inquiry in which the scientists operates, which a Belgian physicist Leon Rosenfeld (1904-1974) called “the domain of validity”,5 a law of nature does not represent a truth about nature. If that were the case, should we perhaps abandon the use of the term, “laws of nature”, altogether? Should we, instead, talk about the laws of classical mechanics, the laws of quantum mechanics, the laws of thermodynamics, and so on, in order to make explicit the domain of validity for each law, which is derived, if not invented, by the scientist based on his/her insight, observation, and reasoning?

The idea that the laws of nature no longer express certitude as they used to in classical mechanics is clearly stated by another Belgian physicist Ilya Prigogine (1917-2003): “In the classical view—and here we include quantum mechanics and relativity—laws of nature express certitudes. When appropriate initial conditions are given, we can predict with certainty the future, or “retrodict” the past. Once instability is included, this is no longer the case, and the meaning of the laws of nature changes dramatically, for they now express possibilities or probabilities.”6 This is so because nature, or the world around us, is a dynamic process full of instabilities: “In our world, we discover fluctuations, bifurcations, and instabilities at all levels. Stable systems leading to certitudes correspond only to idealizations, or approximations.”7

If the laws of nature no longer express certitudes, why do scientists still search for them? The scientists’ preoccupation with searching for the laws of nature stems, in a way, from the preoccupation of the people in the West to seek something where there is nothing, to seek order where there is chaos, to seek action where there ought to be inaction, in their conception of the relationship between man and nature. Prigogine’s conception of the laws of nature as expressing possibilities or probabilities leads us to the conception of nature as a self-organizing system, which comes very close to the Eastern conception of nature as “what is by itself ” In the tradition of Eastern philosophy, nature is seen as a spontaneous, self-generating process, which can be only metaphorically described by a term such as Tao or samsara. Although Buddhists readily admit that we cannot conceive of all causes and conditions, the only law of nature meaningful for them is that everything in the world around us exists only as part of a composite entity that undergoes changes with the constantly evolving network of causes and conditions, which is nature. What is required of us, then, is to acquire “the wisdom to see into the arising and passing away of phenomena”, the wisdom to see how we are integrally involved in that constantly evolving network of causes and conditions around us.

  1. Kenny, Anthony (ed.), Descartes’ Philosophical Letters, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
  2. Newton, Optics, Britannica: Great Books of Western World, 1952, p.541
  3. Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design, New York: Bantam Books, 2010, Chapter 2.
  4. Hawking and Mlovinow, ibid., Chapter 4.
  5. Leon Rosenfeld, “Unphilosophical Considerations on Causality in Physics”, R.S. Cohen and J.J. Stachel (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 21, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979, pp. 666-690.
  6. Prigogine, Ilya, The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature, New York: Free Press, 1996, p.4.
  7. Prigogine, ibid., p. 55.